New Daily Report Quote-Daily Quote from my Correspondences

10-18-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:

Please investigate the lack of required process audits at PSD, and the resulting defects it allows shop to pass on, such as "calibrated arm" (process specification) torques on non-designated torques.

...regarding requirement that Process Audits have to be done regularly and that deficiencies have to be documented and corrected :

Good luck finding documentation. I understand that our PSD "Conforming Product Team" may do something like process audits during their product audits, but these CPT reviews are a joke. I will be old and much grayer when this team ever gets to auditing me. There is no way an audit with such a low frequency could ever assure anything. Ask a BCAG QE to calculate the effect these audits have on the quality of products or processes at PSD at their present frequency. These audits have less chance of affecting product quality than I do of winning the Lotto. Process audits of sufficient frequency to assure process conformance to IRR (Initial Reliability Requirement) and AQL (Acceptable Quality Level) values are the answer.

10-17-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please stop this corrupt practice for good. Tell us that we have to find out what is actually discrepant and fix that, not just bend a tube to fit the discrepant structure and consciously deliver that discrepant structure to our customers without even MRBing it as "Struc and Func," Tell us from now on that we have to follow our procedures--not just change them to the corrupt way we want to do it to "add value" to our bottom line. Tell us that, when a tube does not fit, that if the tube being out of tolerance is not the cause, that a structural inspection will be done to find the discrepancy--not just to force the defects out the door to our unsuspecting customers as we are so used to doing. They are expecting to get a conforming airplane--not garbage. And they expect that if something does not conform, that it will be documented and approved by Engineering, not just given the "what they don’t know won’t hurt them" treatment.

10-16-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

The tooling people would just get in the way of the mechanics "pushing the garbage out the door." So they simply don’t do them (the required structural conformance investigation), and just tell us, their underlings, to write a tag saying the tube won’t fit, and have the tube shop make a special tube to fit the most likely discrepant structure. If we had any guts as a QA department, and stood up to our masters, we would tell shop "no structural investigation, no tag," but we don’t have any guts.

10-15-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (please check out the last few weeks quotes as I haven't updated this page in a while) (continued from previous day's quote):

Section (section I.D.)--This section states that the inspector is supposed to tag the structure, if that is what is causing the tube not to fit, or is to tag the tube if it is discrepant, or is to tag both, if both are discrepant, I believe. The problem with this? As with almost every procedure ever written for Quality--we don’t follow it. Shop does not want to do the required structural investigations to find out what is wrong with the structure. If they found something mislocated, then they would have to fix it, which "wouldn’t support the delivery schedule."

10-14-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Comments about the written policy on tubing rejection and rework:

...see related sections (sections' I.D.s) which have more to say about the structural investigation that should be done when a tube does not fit, but isn’t.

Concerning quoted requirement to fabricate the (modified) tubes when authorized by an NCR )Non-Conformance Record):

Oh really? It looks like I was right! I hate it when that happens!

10-13-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

This illegal rework has been going on at PSD forever, so like alcoholics, it’s easy for them to fall back on old crutches to get them through the tough times. Anyway, while talking to (Customer Coordinator Inspector's name) about the new process, He told me that it wasn’t (our QA supervisor) that had stopped the unauthorized "adjust/bend to fit" tube installation process--it was him. He had seen the tube mockup guys bending tubes any which way they wanted without any authorization other than the "adjust tubing installations as necessary to fit" drawing note, and had went to Engineering to confirm that bending the tubes was what they had meant by that note. It wasn’t. So they were told to follow the old MRB process, as they should have been doing all along. I was relieved. (My QA supervisor) having told shop to stop their unethical practices, of his own volition, did not fit his style or unethical character. He would only do that if his hand was forced, as in the torque witness reinstatement, or in this instance. Now his reputation was safe.

10-12-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Maybe they are making them themselves, but they apparently still tweak them a little during installation sometimes to ensure a perfect fit, or to ensure all struts take the same NCR (Non-Conformance Record) configuration tube, as Engineering will roll the part number after all strut positions take the same tube for (number) consecutive airplanes. There is an incentive for them to tweak the odd tube that won’t fit to ensure a drawing change will occur.

10-11-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

During the time I was inspecting the tube, (Customer Coordinator Inspector's name) came into the area and he, (the tube shop mechanic), and I started talking about the new "tube won’t fit" process. I told (the Customer Coordinator inspector) I thought they shouldn’t even have built the tube until the tag was written. (The Customer Coordinator inspector) argued that they could build whatever they wanted without paperwork, but they couldn’t install it without authorizing paperwork. Then I tried to pry (the tube shop mechanic) for information about how they did the new process. I asked him if they were still "tweaking" production tubes and putting them into the struts with this new process. He said they had stopped doing that about three months ago, and were making the NCR (Non-Conformance Record) tubes "from scratch" themselves now. Of course, I could probably trust him about as far as I could throw him on that, as my statement on the above PAR (Production Action Request) attests.

10-10-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

(Name) fixed the part mark, and I bought the tube build off. I still had to write the revision authorizing it to be installed on the strut (I wrote NCR (Non-Conformance Record) (I.D. number) revision 10, I think, later to authorize it).

10-9-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

I looked at the part mark of the tube--it was wrong. I also found out that this tube I was inspecting was the one that I was just beginning to write the revision to the parent tag for, requesting authorization to install it! More unauthorized rework at PSD. It would not be PSD we all know and shake our heads at without all of this typical unauthorized rework, I guess. Manufacturing and QA Management love to live dangerously, thumbing their noses figuratively at you every time they do something illegal to "maximize value" and/or "alter our processes to meet the delivery schedule." I guess it shows how much they really care about your regulations.

10-8-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

This just in: I had the "opportunity" to work the (model I.D.) strut shop...I stamped in on an NCR (Non-Conformance Record) revision request (for a tube that would not fit) on the call sheet. I was beginning to write the revision, when Mr. (name), from the tube shop, came up to the desk I was at and asked me to inspect a tube. He led me over to a strut, and told me that the tube installed was the one he needed bought off. It was the infamous (part number) tube. He said that the material had already been bought on another tube inspection record. I began to look at the installed tube, which tube shop had built to a...(former) NCR configuration. I checked the bend data printout, I checked it for damage, and I checked for the correct fittings being installed--all I could really check for in the installed condition. Of course, if I was in a real QA department, I would have told him he’d have to pull it out of the installation before I could inspect it, but I was in a pretend QA department, and such a request would result in me, not him, getting disciplined for not following the unwritten procedures and acting like I had some power to assure quality, when the unwritten procedure said I should always defer to the mechanic’s wishes, even when they conflicted with quality and safety.

10-7-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Also write us up if the tube mockup shop personnel should not be "inspecting" tubes by operating the laser tracker machine, and us only "verifying" the printed report, and inspection should be operating the machine to ensure valid data, with the possibly required certifications, of course.

10-6-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

If the old undocumented process of reworking already bought off production tubes without authorization or such described checking, or the new undocumented process of reworking already bought off production tubes without much authorization and with such described checking bothers you, then please write us up.

10-5-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

The process works something like this, from what I know of it: If a tube does not fit, like the frequently unfitting (part number) tube, instead of just writing a PAR (Product Action Request), like they used to do, and getting the tube mockup shop to come out and bend the tube until it fits the installation, per the "new process," the shop writes a PAR, and gets the tube mockup shop to come out and bend the tube until it fits the installation (sounds like Deja Vu, huh?). Then, additional steps are performed in the new undocumented process that weren’t part of the old undocumented process. Tube mockup then takes the tube that was reworked without anyone’s but shop’s authorization, I guess, to their shop and they "laser tracker" it on their machine, "tweak" the tube, or manipulate the laser tracker measurements [we wouldn’t know if they did this or not, as we do not do the laser tracker measurements of the tubes, and we aren’t certified to operate the machine anyway (if certification is required), yet maybe the tube shop personnel are not certified to operate the machine either, for all we know--you might want to check on this] until they get the machine to spit out a report that states that the tube, after illegal rework, still conforms to the Catia bend data. Then they bring it back out to shop and have us, line QA, bless the tube and/or it’s laser tracker report somehow, and shop installs the tube.

10-4-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Just last week I saw them still use this bench to bend a (part number) production tube per shop PAR (Production Action Request) (PAR I.D. number) (reference job (job number, control code (area) and strut position). They are still bending these tubes like before, but a new undocumented process has been blessed by (my QA supervisor), and therefore this new undocumented process is "legal"--not!

10-3-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

The tube at PSD that this illegal bending is done most often to, but is not by far limited to, is the (part number) pneumatic tube on (model I.D.) struts. In fact, the tube shop has a special bench set up by the (model I.D.) strut line (adjacent to the "shop monitored" sealant freezer) in which they did they illegal uninspected rework to this tube and others.

10-2-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Thousands of tubes are flying around on airplanes that may fatigue early due to this excessive uninspected bending, and if they fail and the airplane is able to land, and the airline gets the part number off the ruptured tube and orders another one from Boeing, they’ll be extremely angry when they find out it won’t fit the installation. Also, there are untold numbers of systems that may be impaired by unknown ovality of system tubing that was bent excessively, without inspection or required MRB authorization. Even though we do not inspect for ovality, but should (see item 55), a tube with half the required tube diameter in the bend would be obvious to an inspector, if he ever had the opportunity to inspect this illegal rework. I assume that PSD has notified you of these thousands of illegally reworked tubes on our airplanes due to the size of this problem and the safety aspects of it, but if they have not, please consider this your notification.

10-1-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:

This is one problem that (our QA supervisor) has appeared to fix, but I’ll bring it up to give you a further peek into the unethical world of BCAG. Our PIs (Production Illustrations) have had a general note to "adjust tubing" to meet drawing requirements. This note was put there to allow the mechanic to adjust clamps, add shims, or loosen and re-clock tube assys, C/T tubing installations. However, the tube shop interpreted it differently. To them it allowed them to bend any production tube they wanted to in order to make it fit, bypassing the required MRB process that would have required fabrication of an "-M" (Non-Conformance Record defined) tube, and the time consuming inspection of their tube bending on the NCO (Non-Conformance Order) that fabricated the tube. It saved them a lot of time, and the Company a lot of money, so every one, but a few inspectors like me, looked the other way. The problem with this? Tubes, bent to an unknown degree outside of engineering definition, with no inspection at all, documented or otherwise, of this illegal rework.

9-30-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please make us rethink this whole situation with valid data, not lies that work. Do not consider the fact of fireproof enclosures and fire suppression systems being on/in sections of the EBUs (Engine Build-Ups) in your calculations. They are only backup systems. The valid witnessing of leakproof torques at PSD by future (I hope) non-roller stamping inspectors should be a backup system unto itself, that is now missing, and should ensure the 0 AQL. See the Exhibit AM email for an additional Engineering contact on the leak-proof torque issue. I think you can see, by these emails and the (engineering specification) witness torque emails, that I suspected/knew of the unethicality of our QA management long ago, and was checking up on them, Don Quixote fruitless style, trying to undo the horrific damage they were doing, and have ultimately done, to our Quality System.

9-29-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

One additional lie in their bag of tricks they (Manufacturing and QA Management) probably used in connection with getting the current system of "self-inspection" of these critical plumbing torques instigated at PSD, was the ubiquitous lie of, that if we complied with the requirement, "it would shut PSD down." This is the lie they use to get PSD exceptions to specs so we do not have comply with them. This leakproof torque debacle, while the email doesn’t mention it, is one instance I’m sure it was used. They are probably using it now on the "do not torque adjacent bolts on circular patterns" problem, trying to get (name), key engineer of the (engineering specification) spec, to grant an exception for PSD (see Exhibit AH if you are interested). They are lying when they say this. If they were telling the actual truth, this line would go something like this: "It would add significant time to our builds" or "It would slow us down a little" or "We’ve been doing it so long now wrong, we need to cover our asses for past nonconformances we shipped and make the spec say how we do it, not vice versa. If this gets out we’ll look like the people that put schedule over quality and safety, like we are. If we have to pay the airlines for fixing all of the nonconforming product we shipped, it would shut PSD down, or at least impact BCAG profits" or "It would inconvenience us" or "That safety requirement does not fit in with PSD Lean plans--get rid of it."

9-28-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Let’s take the (next) lie by our management that "justified" omitting QA witnessing of leak-proof torques at PSD, "that there are too few inspectors at PSD." There are really not that many of these leak-proof connections on an individual strut or engine, as our management probably told engineering and will probably tell you. Have them count the few hundred critical fastener torques that we witness on an EBU (Engine Build-Up), then have them count the number of leak-proof connections we torque on that same EBU. The number of critical leak-proof connections we torque will probably be less, and in fact, much less, than the number of critical fastener torques we witness on an EBU. How much extra time does it take for QA to witness a torque than if a mechanic does it without witness?

Almost no extra time. Is only thirty seconds more for the mechanic to call the inspector too much to ask to increase the safety of the people on our airplanes, and the safety of mechanics at Prime Divisions that have deal with the spewing connections we left loose at PSD, that did not wait to fail in service? They will probably try to tell you "just look at the big picture"--thirty seconds on each connection would equal a huge amount of profit loss for the Company. Except shop does not torque just individual connections in a system, then one more later. They are supposed to torque all connections in a system at the end of installing that plumbing system, not to just install one tube at a time. (Our QA supervisor) told us in our...crew meeting that recently seven gallons of hydraulic fluid leaked from a B-Nut (tubing) connection to the hydraulic pump during a wet run of an EBU at Prime Division that supposedly was a witness torque at PSD. Whether it was a witness torque or not, or whether it was loosened after inspection at PSD is anyone’s guess. (Our QA supervisor) seemed to imply it was a QA escape, but I know anything (our QA supervisor) says in crew meetings should probably be taken with a grain of salt, unless it jibes with his true unethical BCAG QA Supervisor nature. He only speaks the truth to us individually, behind closed doors. Of course, what he said may have been true, and one of his "trained to roller stamp" inspectors may have bought that torque, if such a witness on that connection existed. I have personally had to re-witness witness torques on hydraulic pump unions on the 747/767 EBU line, where a PSD roller stamping inspector, (name), Lead Inspector, had "witnessed" the torques, that were not obviously, by visual inspection, completely torqued, and would have similarly leaked at (Prime Division, in this case the Everett factory). The current ineffectiveness of our management trained roller stamping inspectors is no reason to let these critical 0 AQL leak-proof torques go uninspected. The effectiveness of our Quality System will ultimately be restored, if you investigate per this report. I believe these torques can be done with only the current inspection force, if they are made what they should be--a witness. So what if I’m slightly off and they have to hire even one more inspector? Is the lack of their extra pay by their absence, due to the possible maintaining of the current lie-gotten "non-witness" leakproof torque system at PSD, worth the lives of hundreds at a crash? Maybe to our management, but not to me. So much for the "there are too few inspectors at PSD" lie.

9-27-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Let’s take the first lie by our management that "justified" omitting QA witnessing of leak-proof torques at PSD, "the tight spaces make it difficult for an inspector to actually view the witnessing." I have worked most everywhere at PSD over the years except much of the 777 EBUs (Engine Build-Ups), and I can unequivocally state that there are no such tight spaces that make it difficult for an inspector to actually view the witnessing, as all plumbing we install has been designed to be accessible by airline mechanics, and the viewing of these connections can be done from multiple angles in nearly all cases. We don’t even have the obstructions that airline mechanics have to deal with, at PSD--engines and cowling installed on the struts! The only place I can think of that would even be mildly "difficult" to witness the torque of would be one (fire extinguishing) system B-Nut (tubing connection) just above the midspar in the forward section of the 747 struts, and that would only be "difficult" to witness for the kind of inspectors at PSD that inspect critical items with only a coffee cup in their hands. Our management will probably try to tell you we don’t have this basic inspection tool at PSD, in order to maintain the cherished non-witness status of these torques, but we do. It is the inspection mirror, and with it, and with the other, "should be" obligatory inspection "tool," a flashlight, it would be very easy to witness the noted torque without even interfering with the mechanic. So much for the "the tight spaces make it difficult for an inspector to actually view the witnessing" lie.

9-26-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

"The big reasons for not having line inspectors witness leak-proof torques at PSD are that the tight spaces make it difficult for an inspector to actually view the witnessing, and that there are too few inspectors at PSD?" Sounds like super-technical statistical QE (Quality Engineering) reasoning, doesn’t it? More accurately, it is the best reason they could fictionalize in order to save PSD the minimal extra costs of the witnessing of these torques, and for our QA Management to avoid "interruption of the lean manufacturing flow," their main goal (not the goal to avoid defects in the product, like you might expect), that might result from a valid inspection regimen that would ensure the 0 AQL (Acceptable Quality Limit) requirement.

9-25-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Do you think the exemption for PSD not to witness engineering required leak-proof torques on the engines and struts was given because our mechanics make few, if any, mistakes, the engines don’t need the plumbing systems we install to run (as (my QA Supervisor) would probably tell us line inspectors), or that some huge, statistically valid study was done by QE (Quality Engineering) to show that the risk of a leaking connection to ETOPS was minimal in relation to the inspection costs saved? Nope. Read Exhibit AL for the real, sad truth from the eyewitness engineer that worked the PSD X-XX change, (name), of why this critical torque witness was axed for PSD--simple (non-statistically valid) lies. What the last sentence of the first paragraph of the email shows, is the reasoning PSD QA used to probably accede to their real bosses’ unethical, purely non-quality and non safety related wishes, Manufacturing Management. Lies.

9-24-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please investigate the lack of leak-proof torque witness at PSD. True, (engineering specification), PSD (Process Specification Departure) X-XX section XX.X.X. (which may have been incorporated by now, hopefully) exempts PSD QA from verifying leak-proof torques, "unless specified by the engineering drawing." However, (engineering specification) page X Table X allows an AQL (Acceptable Quality Level) of 0 on leak-proof torques, which means, that in addition to QA having to witness the mechanic do the torque, probably God would also be required to watch too, to meet that AQL. We used to have to witness leak-proof torques that the values of were called out on the drawing, just like...bolt torques, but they killed that requirement without cause (murdered it) near the time of the drawing designated critical torque "no witness" debacle to compromise quality and safety in return for more profits and better "inspector-less" manufacturing flow. See Exhibits AK for two emails from our management on the subject.

9-23-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote). This item might have some applicability to the recent explosion of a 737 in Japan, with all of the passengers thankfully (but barely) escaping with their lives, mostly due to an alert ground crew person at the airport gate it had just pulled up to noticing the leaking fuel from a puncutured fuel tank caused by an omitted or misplaced washer on a fastener before the passengers could be engulfed by the resulting conflagration:

This item is almost Deja Vu to the (below) item. It is not that major, unless you expect BCAG to build conforming products to the fastener level, which I think you might. It illustrates again how screwed up (BCA) is to requirements that would allow us to build products with stable conformity from unit to unit. It mainly has an effect on inspectors like me, who actually inspect fastener installations, and who don’t like to guess what the configuration of the product should be when I inspect it. This item is one of the few situations where engineering has not screwed up, and that common sense and (engineering specification) requirements, without modification, should prevail. However they don’t, because shop does what they want, whether it is right or not, and inspectors don’t care or don’t speak up because our corrupt QA Management will find us new jobs beside the freeway if we do: It has to do with washer position on fastener installations. Many of our drawings show fastener installations where a bolt, a plain washer, and a nut are called out without a specific head direction or washer position callout. The washer should go under the nut, as it is uncountersunk, and no such washers should go under the head, right? Wrong per shop tribal knowledge and build methods. No, the washer always is installed under the component, bolt head or nut, that gets rotated during installation, per shop preference of which side to rotate. This shows how often shop reads their specs, as this might have been partially true about 15 years ago, per the (engineering specification) spec. I don’t know if you want to write us up for this or not. You are welcome to. It is mainly illustrative of the inability and/or unwillingness of inspectors to attempt to politely enforce even basic fastener installation requirements like these for fear of the "is it critical!" berating "yell" that (inspector's name) got from (my QA supervisor) in that crew meeting when speaking of missing "non-critical" shakedown inspection buyoffs, and fear of the later "not supporting the delivery schedule" private meeting with (my QA supervisor) to get your "award" for enforcing basic Engineering requirements, a CAM (Corrective Action Memo, any three of which result in termination). See Exhibit AI item 1 for an email I sent to the keeper of the (engineering specification) spec about this subject. He seems to think the drawing is deficient if it doesn’t state where to put the washer. The middle sentence of his answer, I believe, is in error, as it should not be up to the mechanic where to put the washer. See the following sections of (the engineeriung spec) for what shop should be doing in these situations, and what we would be making them do, if we weren’t instructors, and were really inspectors allowed to inspect the product:...

...(Note about washer use requirements on painted parts) Nope, most of the parts we misplace the drawing washer on are bare parts, and if such a primered part existed for which we needed to comply with this section by having a washer under the head that we had to torque because of no access to the nut, then we wouldn’t just take the drawing plain washer, that should always be under the nut, and put it under the head for protection of the finish. We should comply with the spec section X.X.X above, and add an additional (correct washer) from Table XX, as required, and put it under the head, leaving the plain drawing washer under the nut.

9-22-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

References:

NCR (Non-Conformance Record) (NCR I.D.) I wrote on the (A/P Model I.D.) APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) due to prior inspectors had been buying the APUs off with the incorrect bolt head direction per (engineering specification) on single pin joints on the APU mount (items 1 and 3), as shop had installed them. Items 2 and 4 had to do with the wrong washers being installed on the bolts with the incorrect head direction. I believe I asked for a line check, or inferred one was needed on the tag.

9-21-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

I have noticed problems with our drawings matching the AMMs (Airplane Maintenance Manuals)/PPBU (Power Plant Build-Up) Manuals. I think I heard a rumor once that we weren’t updating our AMMs/PPBU Manuals (because of MRB (Rejection Tag) changes?). At least our drawings seem to be better than the AMMs/PPBU Manuals, though you’d expect we'd want to have our customers see our best, not our worst. I’ve submitted one change for an AMM (reference PCR # TBC-PCR-XX-XXXX-XXXXXX), though I’ve actually read very little from AMMs/PPBU Manuals, considering how much is out there, so far.

Representative installations:

The (installation number) (Thermal Anti-Ice) duct installation on job (job I.D., model I.D., line number I.D.).

...Drawing (drawing number) sheet 5 has three views of link fasteners. The views seem to indicate a head (direction) position is required (pictorially, which violates drafting standards), regardless of the position of the clamp-up bushings (which violates (the design standard) and conflicts with the above two drawings), which matches (the engineering specification) requirements. But drawings trump spec requirements, and fasteners are not supposed to be shown in detail, so which direction the fasteners are supposed to be installed in the above (noted) drawings is anybody’s guess, because there are lots of conflicting requirements. The only given is that these (noted) drawings are typical of the quality and interpretability of our drawings at (BCA), where fastener installation requirements are concerned.

9-20-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Anyway, you can probably tell I have done a lot of research into this, without much success in finding the "Holy Grail" of documentation, like I did on the MHIR subject. Maybe the fact that I actually care about the products we build is the problem. I think the main problem is that our Engineering department is not complying with the (design specification) documents, which are mandatory requirements, I believe, unless they get (an approval) for a drawing departure to those requirements. What the kicker is is that the way we install these single pin fasteners, per the Catia drawing picture sheet, with the (fastener) and (fastener) next to the bushing that slips into the clevis, violates (design specification), Single Pin Joints, page XX Figure X-X requirements to install the clamp-up bushing adjacent to the (fastener). That is done so, if the nut (loosens, the fasteners) will stay in place until the next maintenance visit. Please check into this, and have our engineers fix it if required so we can build safe and duplicate from unit to unit products, or let me know if I am all wet on this subject and missed something that allows this confused state of drawing and spec to exist. If there is a problem, be sure the AMMs (Airplane Maintenance Manuals)/PPBU (Power Plant Build-Up) Manuals are revised also, so everything is the same after maintenance.

9-19-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:

This item is not that major, unless you expect (BCA) to build conforming products to the fastener level, which I think you might. It illustrates again how screwed up (BCA) is to requirements that would allow us to build products with stable conformity from unit to unit. It mainly has an effect on inspectors like me, who actually inspect fastener installations, and who don’t like to guess what the configuration of the product should be when I inspect it: It has to do with the required head direction of fasteners, and the lack of definition of such by (BCA) drawings. (Design specification), section XX.X, states to not show fasteners in detail, and to add a head side direction required flag note if a specific head direction is required. Section XX.X.X. states to call out fasteners in one view only. (Design specification) section X.X. states drawings are the basic means of communication between Engineering and other organizations, and must be clear, concise, and subject to only one interpretation. (Design specification) section X. states to use (design specifications) two dimensional drawing standards except where Catia (design specifications) series standards identify departures. Catia design standards do not give any exceptions to the noted design standards. This mainly affects single pin joints per the following (engineering specification) section:

a. Bolts used in single pin joints or in control systems shall be installed with the heads (direction) or (direction), unless otherwise specified. All other bolts shall be installed with the heads (direction) or (direction) wherever practical.

These single pin joint fasteners are mainly used in engine mounts, and in links that support duct installations. It is shop practice to always put the nut and plain washer on the bushing side of the joint, regardless of the noted (specification) requirements. Most of our Catia drawings do show the bolts installed this way, and if they don’t, shop writes ELRs (Engineering Liaison Requests) to make them that way. There are no head side required notes per (the design specification requirements). The Catia drawings show the fasteners as gotten from the (Catia) repository, and these fasteners are practically shown in lifelike detail, bolt head and all. Therefore shop mechanics, and probably most inspectors, including, I know, (name), Customer Coordinator, think these fasteners must be installed as depicted pictorially on the Catia drawing, if they care about fastener installation at all. These Catia drawing(s) violate (design specification), section XX.X, that states to not show fasteners in detail, and (there) is no exception to this in the Catia design standards I am aware of. There is also nothing anywhere that states that fasteners must be installed in the direction depicted on the Catia drawing when they lack a head direction note, that I am aware of. So we are building these critical single pin joints by simply "tribal knowledge," and not any engineering requirement. And we are ignoring the only real engineering requirement we have, which is the noted section of (the specification) that states these types of fasteners shall be installed with the heads (direction) or (direction) (to prevent the (fastener) from falling out until the next maintenance check if the (fastener loosens)). I think we should ignore the head direction shown on the picture sheet, unless there is a required head direction note on the drawing, but I am a minority in that on these critical single pin joints. The part of the...spec section that states that all other bolts shall be installed with the heads (direction) or (direction) wherever practical is a joke, and shouldn’t even be in the spec. It is unenforceable by QA, even if the shop has a mile of room to install fasteners per the requirement.

The chances of an inspector, considering the corrupted state of our Quality System, being able to enforce this part of the section in such a case without being fired "for not supporting the delivery schedule," is about equal to the chance of you accidentally running over and killing the real Easter Bunny on Easter morning.

9-18-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please investigate the following issue that makes all your efforts to get BCAG jobs to comply with requirements for inspectors to witness drawing designated torques useless: On XX/XX/XX, I was lent to the (model I.D.) strut area, as they were shorthanded. I stamped in on a torque inspection on the call sheet for Dennis Harem,...strut mechanic. It was for torques on the (part number) clamps on the precooler ducting and fan air valve. He did the first torque on the fan air valve clamp, then reset the torque wrench for the next clamp torque value and began to torque it. I told him he had not shown me what the torque wrench was set to on the prior torque, and that I would like him to torque it again and show me the setting. He went ballistic. He got up, reset the wrench, gave it to me, then said angrily, "Gerry, why do you always treat us like children?" I said I thought he knew that I always would look at the wrench setting on each witness torque. I had inspected many of his torques when I used to be assigned to the strut shop. "Torqued," he angrily retorqued the fan air valve clamp and then did the other torques on the precooler ducting clamps. You can see (now) what an ethical inspector has to go through. It was obvious to me from this incident, that the "witnessing of drawing designated torques without looking at the torque wrench setting," and probably even without looking at the wrench calibration date, was still going on strong by roller stamping inspectors at PSD that weren’t brave enough to stand up to such abuse. So, you see, even after all of your work, without the reform of the line inspectors that roller stamp per QA Management direction, most of your efforts will go to waste.

References:

See Exhibit AG for an email exchange I had with someone on the BCAG Torque Team that may be insightful from your perspective. You can see that I, the lowly powerless line inspector, was trying to right the scuttled ship of witness torques at PSD even 9 months ago.

9-17-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please also investigate the following drawing designated torque problem that illustrates how clueless we have been: We have always, since PSD inception, torqued almost all of the drawing designated torques on the inlets, exhaust plugs and sleeves, QADs, generators, hydraulic pumps, you name it, anything with a circular pattern, or even a multiple row installation like the (model I.D.) fan cowl chine, in a circular pattern, in violation of (specification section) (referenced in the reference section below) that states not to successively tighten adjacent bolts or nuts in that situation, and instead to first snug up all the bolts, snugging up opposite bolts all around, then tighten all the bolts, applying the final torque to opposite bolts in a pattern similar to that shown in Figure X of the spec.

The reason? When you tighten adjacent bolts on a part like an inlet or exhaust sleeve, you chase a gap around the inlet or sleeve, which gets larger and larger as you progess, and this gap gets pushed all the way around, getting concentrated between the first and last torqued bolts. This probably overstresses the first torqued bolt, and structure in that area. Excessive gap at that area also results. We never check the gap between the noted parts and the engine that I am aware of, so unknown gapping conditions exist in service. This may also effect the "calibrated eyeball" inspected (basically uninspected) fit and fair of these parts, also. If we haven’t notified you of the many thousands of discrepant installations that resulted from this improper torquing of drawing designated torques, then please write us up. Who knows how many thousands of engines have bolts rattling around in their inlets or exhaust installations because of this problem. Even your local uneducated auto mechanic knows not to do this on the tires on your car, but we don’t care, as we only care, it seems, about what will "push more garbage out the door" faster. This very recently came up as an issue at PSD, as (name), the thorough inspector who still falsely believes (per the unwritten BCAG Quality System ) that he is an inspector, and not a mechanic instructor on corporate welfare, (brought it up). He started making shop torque anything that fit the noted section of (the spec), including inlets and exhaust sleeves, per the noted section. This made shop go ballistic, as you might know would happen per my descriptions of their character so far. They did the usual, and instead of happily complying with the obvious spec requirement, to make sure that products shipped from PSD from now on would conform to requirements, they immediately began an effort to kill the spec requirement for PSD, just so our build times would not increase by the few minutes that building conforming products would require. I found out (the inspector) was enforcing this by shop rumor. (My QA supervisor) knows about this. But does he tell all his inspectors to make sure they make shop torque per the requirement? No. And you know only too well why. See Exhibit AH for an email that shows the PSD "mechanic’s position" on this and other issues of torque. It shows that pretty much only the build times are what they care about, not the safety of the people on board our aircraft.

9-16-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

By the way, I’ve heard rumors that the mandatory compliance date you gave us for witness torque inspections to be added to the plans for drawing designated torques was XX/XX/XX, which we missed. There are still probably many drawing designated torque inspections missing from all our program’s plans, as our QA Planning department went AWOL again, and let M.E. (Manufacturing Engineering) add/revise all of the inspections, with no oversight. Please write us up, if we missed your "drop dead" date. The evidence of non-compliance is in the (model I.D.) completed records, and probably still out on the production floor in assorted partially worked/still to be worked plans.

9-15-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please use extreme caution when approving any changes to the drawings to delete drawing designated torques. Engineering, like QA, is under extreme pressure from shop management to delete any requirements, no matter how safety related, in order to compress their build times, save cost, meet schedules, and as (my inspector coworker) said, "to push more garbage out the door." Our QA Management has totally capitulated to their every unethical whim, and Engineering may also. Do not allow any drawing designated torques that were on the drawings from inception of a program, or drawing designated torques that were added because of problems found in service, to be deleted.

Use the same "fault tree analysis", or similar tools, that were used in type design approval, when deciding if a torque should be deleted or not. Please do not consider the current extreme state of ineffectiveness of our line inspection force as a reason to delete those torques. This report is meant to restore that effectivity, with your help. An engineering change to delete torques that is presented to you with the reasoning that less inspection will save BCAG money, in my opinion, should be rejected. Believe, me (I’ve witnessed this), that, while the reasoning for most engineering changes to delete drawing designated torques may be dressed up with statistics and other manipulated data and reasoning, the only driver behind these changes is to, as (my inspector coworker) said, "to push more garbage out the door," without any real consideration of the consequences, because as (my corrupt QA supervisor) said, the statistics say our products are fool-mechanic-proof and cannot crash because of uninspected manufacturing error.

9-14-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

We just recently, at the end of February, supposedly revised the last program at PSD, the (model I.D.) EBU program, to have witness buyoffs for the drawing designated torques. (My QA supervisor) finally told them they would have to comply with the witnessing of drawing designated torques. They immediately wrote ELRs (Engineering Liaison Requests) to delete all the torque callouts from the drawings, as the QA witnessing of the torques added some minutes to the shop build schedule, and those minutes were not an equitable tradeoff to shop in return for the increased likelihood of safe flight benefiting (by correct levels of inspection of those torques) those people on the airplanes on which their EBUs would be installed (if they even considered such a tradeoff at all, as build times, and build times only, are what the shop leads and shop management seem only to consider).

9-13-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:

Torque witness: I believe you have us under the gun to fix our witness of drawing designated torque debacle, which should be proof enough of the motivations and corruption of our QA Management that created this debacle, that allowed untold numbers of critical torques to escape required levels of inspection.

You probably know, as I do, a "verify torque" inspection is pretty much worthless. It only proves the mechanic can enter the correct value on the paper, and has little real relationship to conformity of the product.

Just a week or two ago, on the (model I.D.) EBU (Engine Build-Up) line, during torque witnessing, I witnessed the mechanic, (name), set the torque wrench to the wrong torque on two consecutive separate torque value requirement torques, so these things were occurring all of the time to the critical torques we didn’t witness during that period. The mechanic would just set the wrench to what he thought he set it to, do the torque, then write the value he thought he set the wrench to on the job for inspection to "verify."

These incorrect torques happen on (BAC specification called out) torques shop does without any form of inspection, even the required sampling inspection of these torques per (the specification), all of the time.

9-12-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Also see why they never caught this problem there before shipping the T/Rs (Thrust Reversers). I suspect they don’t check the product for handling damage between the final shakedown and shipment (no required shipping inspection per (our QA Manual requirement). See Exhibit AF, for an email I wrote to (name), CAU (corrective Action Unit) Investigator, complaining of the ineffective CA on this damage.

9-11-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Please investigate all tags for the last year for similar bogus CAR (Corrective Action Record) closeouts that purposely avoid repairing known defects at BCAG, and instead knowingly deliver those discrepant products to our customers to simply avoid costs and, consequently, fatten profits at the possible expense of human lives. Also please investigate the first example problem, and fix it, because we purposely did not. Have BCAG issue the necessary SB (Service Bulletin) for the airlines to inspect for this damage and fix it before cracks develop in the frame or adjacent parts. Check out Wichita, and find the tool that causes the damage and make us fix it so it won’t create these defects anymore, as we are unwilling to spend the money to fix (it)without your help.

9-10-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

As I can’t write this up again due to the fact that not just banishment to a make-work job in the office will result, but banishment from BCAG itself will likely result, please take care of this discrepancy for me. While I don’t know if another El Al style crash will result or not if corrosion causes some damage to these unprotected roller swaged bushings, Engineers put requirements on drawings and in specs for a reason, not just on a whim, as QA seems to think by the way we enforce them. The noted problem is C/T (Common To) (the) (part number) installation, C/T the (part number) spring beams, C/T the (part number) nested bushings. See the noted latter two tags for references. Also see "flag" (in a circle) 8 on the figure on SB (Service Bulletin) 747-54A2152 revision 4 page 54 on the upper half of the page entitled "Typical Spring Beam Lug Rework, Nested Bushing Installation," which states on page 60, step 10, to do a "bead sealant in swaged lip." The service bulletin is much more clear than the drawing and spec on this issue. Do not stop with the write up of this installation. I suspect the same discrepancy exists on all similar bushing installations on all of our struts. We, as QA, should not have the luxury, as we do now, to say which things on the drawing we will ensure are (done) correctly, and which we will purposely ignore, even though we know they are not done correctly.

\9-9-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

I noticed, during a recent walk through of the strut shop, that the (model I.D.) struts were missing the fillet seal again I had written up just before my banishment. From page 30 of my original letter:

I also was writing up missing fillet seals from Wichita around the bushings in the strut to wing attach fittings. I found this discrepancy while inspecting the rework of a damaged bushing per NCR (Non-Conformance Record) (NCR I.D.). Examples: NCRs (NCR I.D.) and (NCR I.D.).

9-8-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Original letter, item 1, page 30: After I had written several up, they started to come in in the condition they should have been received--with no damage, although one came in in which it was obvious that unauthorized rework had been done to the damage in Wichita, prior to being received at PSD. The damage had been crudely blended out, with no required rotopeen or MRB stamp (NCR (Non-Conformance Record) (NCR I.D.) items 7, 8, and 9).

9-7-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):

Anyway, I got tired of it, so I left routing comments on NCR (NCR I.D.) laying out everything, why I knew the damage was as received, which NCR’s CARs (Corrective Action Records) had been bought off in error with the wrong reason for the damage, and that I suspected tooling locators in Wichita for causing the damage. I monitored the CAR to see if Wichita would finally get the message and fix the problem by putting the real reason for the damage on the CAR. Nope. They simply cut and pasted the wrong reason onto that CAR from an earlier CAR, denying responsibility again, which would result in no action to fix the problem, as PSD did not normally receive those T/Rs (Thrust Reversers), and the Renton inspectors may not find the damage, as they were unaware of the NCRs that had been written at PSD on the problem. I wasn’t about to give up yet. The CAR had not been finalized yet. I got the name of the Wichita investigator that had written the bogus non-fix on the CAR, and looked her number up and called her. I told her everything I had written in my routing comments and told her that I, a line inspector, had witnessed that the damage was as received from them. I asked her why she had mentioned "skin quality" for this non-clad part in the CAR. By her answer I found out she had no idea where the damage was on the T/R, yet they had denied responsibility for it anyway. I told her that I had attached marked up drawings to the NCRs and that I gave accurate three point locations for each damage location. I asked her to look into it again, and I told her exactly where to look for the object that made the damage. I told her it was probably a holding fixture in which the T/R was placed during shakedown in which the holding points of the tool were damaging the T/R and the damage was covered by the tool during the final shakedown, making finding it during the inspection impossible, or it was a functional test tool that did it after shakedown, or it was a lifting fixture that did it after shakedown. She said she would look into it again and the call ended. A time later I looked the CAR back up again and it had been closed out. Yep, it read the same as before, denying responsibility. Nothing would ever be done to solve the problem, as I would see no more of those T/Rs at PSD, most likely, in order to try and get effective and ethical CA again on the damage. What’s bad is that I knew that they, Wichita, knew that they caused the damage. One of the T/Rs came in, shortly after my first NCRs on the damage, with the same damage, except that a crude attempt had been made to do an illegal blend out of the damage, as no QA would have ever bought that blend, as the surface was still very rough, even for a non-sonic edge area which this wasn’t, most of the damage was not blended out, and no attempt was made to alodine or primer the "repair," or to MRB (Material Review Board) stamp it. I had gotten this same illegal repair response from Wichita before when I was in (model I.D.) struts on my T/R hinge damage tags: (To be continued..)