5-11-07 quote: This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report.

Another problem with vendor rework is the cannibalization of engines and possibly...struts for parts to use on other engines and struts, making "Hangar Queen" engines in effect. I really doubt all of this cannibalization is on the up and up and done with the required paperwork (including removals) and retests. Please investigate, find out which engines were cannibalized, and make sure all the paperwork shows the correct process was followed. I seem to remember a 737 engine a few years ago that had a spinner and/or fan blade(s) stolen, I mean cannibalized, for use on another engine. When new parts were put back on the cannibalized engine and/or the cannibalized parts were put on the engine that needed the parts, one, or both of the engines ran out of balance because some required balancing was not done prior to engine run/flight. I don’t know how they fixed the problem. I don’t know if they told you of this episode, or not. If not, please consider this your notification.

During your investigation of this item, please clear up a problem that we have no intention of clearing up, as we don’t have a clue about it. When a part, engine, generator, T/R, APU, etc. is rejected at PSD, what do we or the vendor rework it to? It is the undocumented "RTS (Return to Supplier) in Place" system at PSD. Please make us document it, and document it correctly (See exhibit N for an email I got from (name), our resident expert on this undocumented process). Please answer the following questions for us we were too embarrassed to ask you, as they would prove just how out of bed we are about what we do:

A. (Our QA supervisor) said once in one of our crew meetings, that even if we remove and replace a bracket on a functionally tested item like an engine, then even that limited rework would invalidate the vendor test and require a retest. Is that true? If its so, then please write us up for the many retests we have missed, as (our QA supervisor) doesn’t "walk his talk" on this subject. And if it isn’t so, please give us the FAA-approved guidelines on what kind of rework/repair of vendor items would require a retest.

B. Many of our tags say to "rework per AMM (Airplane Maintenance Manual)." Is this correct? I was under the impression that the AMM was only used after the airplane was in service. When does a vendor item require rework per the AMM? After delivery to the airline? Or after delivery to Boeing? I believe we take the position that it is on delivery to Boeing, but to say PSD does anything at all with consistency is sacrilege to our beloved all "over the map" ways. If we are supposed to rework these items per the AMM, a Boeing document, then doesn’t that conflict with the name of this undocumented process, "RTS in place?" We are allowing the vendor to do the rework at PSD, or doing the rework for them at PSD, to simply avoid the tax implications and production disruption that sending the part back to the vendor would entail. So shouldn’t the work be performed at PSD to the same vendor drawings, specs, and functional tests that are used at the vendor, to which they would have to work if we had sent it back in "as received" condition, without ever being installed on the airplane? I’m thinking we should not be doing this work to our AMM, but to vendor drawings, specs, and tests, or maybe to the vendor CMM, as the part is uninstalled. Or should the vendor be repairing these parts per their repair station certificate, if they have one? On NCR (number) on a 767 T/R (Thrust Reverser) blocker door replacement (see item 8 of my original letter), I requested a vendor Removal Record for the rework the vendor had done per our AMM. The unstamped copy had the (vendor) repair station certificate number on the form. Please set us straight on this, permanently.

This is being reiterated from a later section due to applicability: Sometimes our Liaison Engineers are so clueless that writing a revision to get a disposition fixed is a useless endeavor. Check out (NCR number) revision 2, I believe. The discrepancy was on two vendor clamps C/T a vendor tube that had damaged cushions. The revision 0 disposition stated to remove and replace the clamps per AMM (Airplane Maintenance Manual). This tag epitomizes the danger of accepting vendor rework per the undocumented "tribal knowledge" PSD way, of just making sure the vendor signature is attached to the tag, without any inspection of the rework itself. I did my usual inspection of the rework. I got the AIPC (Airplane Illustrated Parts Catalog) pages from the Boeing Maintenance Document website that showed the vendor clamp installations. I noticed on the AIPC figure part number listing that under the vendor tube P/N and/or the vendor/clamp P/Ns, that only a (engine vendor) MM (Maintenance Manual) section was listed. No AMM reference was listed. That was why I could not find the removal and replacement instructions for the clamps and tube in the AMM--they were not there--they were only in the vendor MM. I looked at the lower replaced clamp and it was fine--per AIPC, at least. Then I looked at the upper clamp that was replaced. The horrific scene that met my eyes justified in spades why I inspected vendor rework when other Boeing inspectors did not. Even though the airplane was not in all likelihood going to crash because of this one poorly installed clamp, it made you wonder what other more critical components of the engine the vendor mechanic had worked on. The mechanic had had to remove a bolt to get the damaged clamp off of the tube. In that process they managed to drop the washer that had been under the bolt’s head. They then slapped the new clamp on, probably in an extreme hurry, as instead of the new clamp being butterflied under or over the adjacent clamp as the original clamp had been, they butterflied it’s lugs with the other clamp’s lugs in an interwoven fashion, so that neither clamp would be completely closed when torqued down. Then they reinstalled the bolt, without the washer they had dropped, and then torqued it down, probably with their calibrated arms. Of course, the washer had been required for a purpose, and when the bolt was torqued the uppermost clamp lug twisted with the bolt head due to friction, twisting the clamp into permanent deformity. Of course, the vendor mechanic was in such a hurry they did not see this, or did not give a damn if they did, and the vendor rep that signed off the work also missed it. I now had to write up the three new discrepancies on the NCR, whereas if I had not inspected the work like my comrades my job would be much easier--like a roller stamping inspector’s life was. I wrote the revision, and also noted on the revision that there were no instructions in the AMM to replace the clamps, so I had inspected the work to the AIPC instead. I also stated that the rework instructions were in the (engine vendor) MM, I believe. To make a much too long story finally end, the disposition for my revision came back to state to remove and replace the newly discrepant clamp per the AMM! Yep, same disposition as revision 0 that was incorrect, except the engineer had actually called out a section of the AMM in his new disposition, whereas the whole AMM document number was listed in the original disposition and us line inspectors were supposed to fish for the right section of the AMM to do the inspection to. I looked at the AMM section the engineer had called out. It only applied to Boeing tubes and clamps, not the vendors. Oh well. I had tried to get the message across in my revision that the vendor MM applied, not Boeing’s--to no avail. I decided not to try again as that would likely be similarly fruitless, and just result in me inspecting yaks at Boeing Siberia.

This just in: While I had been recently substituting for (line inspector's name) on 777 EBUs (Engine Build-Ups) while he was on a work related trip, an NCR, (number) was written on a galled MS21902-6R union C/T the PS3 air valve supply cover C/T the engine core diffuser and combustion case of the (vendor I.D.) engine I was assigned to inspect. (Name), the 777 EBU Manufacturing Lead for the shift, put the tag up for inspection on the call sheet. I stamped into it and did my usual perusal of the work, even if it had been signed off by the (vendor) representative on the NCR attachment as acceptable to him. I talked to the Boeing mechanic who had done the replacement. She gave me the bag that the replacement part came in when I asked if she still had it. She began to get angry with me when she realized that I was going to inspect the work. She said that the representative had signed off on the work, so my inspection of the work was not necessary. I looked at the bag and it was marked for a MS21902J6 union. I looked at the coding stamped on the side of the union that was installed. It was a MS21902J6 union, not the MS21902-6R union that was required per the NCR. I looked in (the online specification library), and the MS21902-6R union was made of 321 CRES (Corrosion Resistant Steel), which had higher heat resistance and higher strength properties (than) 304 CRES, which the substituted MS21902J6 union was made of. Also, I knew that substitutions couldn’t be made on NCRs without engineering concurrence. I told (the Manufacturing Lead) about the discrepancy. He said that the rep had signed for the work so I had to buy it. I then routed the NCO for the tag back to him stating in the comments on the NCO and on the call sheet that the wrong part had been installed. (The Manufacturing Lead) then immediately put the tag back on the call sheet as complete with the same wrong part installed, telling me that he could "play this game all day if he needed to." I stamped into the tag and I asked him if he had the phone number for the rep so I could call him and ask him a few questions. He said he thought that he did, but that he wasn’t going to give them to me because I only should just buy the work off, as the vendor had signed for the work. A little while later I saw (name), MRB Coordinator, in the area and I asked if he had the phone number of the (vendor) rep. He said he did. I asked him if he would email me the phone number when he got back to his office. He said he would. I got the email a short while later and called the rep who had signed off the work, (name), who was actually the (vendor) inspector, I later found out. I told him about the wrong union being installed on the engine. He said that he had authorized that substitution, and he had authorized that same substitution before. I believe he asked what our AMM (Airplane Maintenance Manual) said. I told him that the part was not shown on our AMM. I asked him for the (vendor) IPC (Illustrated Parts Catalog) and Engine Manual document numbers so I could see if PSD had a copy of them so I could look at them. He gave the numbers to me. After the call, I went back onto the jig and told (name), the other inspector on 777 EBUs, that I was going up to Engineering to see if I could find the (vendor) Engine Manual as the wrong union had been installed per the NCR I was inspecting and I wanted to see if the substitution was authorized in the manual. She then told me that she had already bought the tag I was stamped in on! I was amazed. Apparently (the Manufacturing Lead) had gone to her, bypassing me, to get the tag bought off as I was not quick enough to roller stamp it for his liking. I asked her why she bought it. (Name) said that she had bought it because the vendor had signed for the work, and that that was all that we were ensuring when we bought the tag. I told her I always looked at the work because I had found many instances when the work was screwed up in the process. I told her I was going up to look for the (vendor) Engine Manuals anyway. It was about ten after one O’clock at that point, so the day was pretty much over as most of the mechanics went home at 1:30. After walking around the entire three story Engineering office and asking a few people, I found the (vendor) manuals in the microfilm station on the second floor. I looked at the (document number and vendor name) IPC index. Only one MS21902-6R union was used on the entire engine. I forwarded to the referenced section 72-41-00 figure 3. In the figure, item 380 was the union in question. I looked at the figure table for the item number. The item’s part number was MS21902-6R. No surprise. Looking below that P/N in the table, I was also not surprised, from what I knew of vendor reps. No substitute unions at all were authorized in the IPC for that union. It was past my quitting time at that point, on that Friday day. I resolved to fix the problem on Monday.

On Monday, I wrote a revision to NCR (number) stating the new discrepancy, that the wrong part was installed. I couldn’t simply have the tag opened up, as (the Manufacturing Lead) would just get it bought off without rework as he had done before. I attached the IPC pages I had printed out from my Friday microfilm research to the NCR so noone could question that I was right or not again about the subject. I found out later that the revision was dispositioned to remove the MS21902J6 union and to replace it with the correct MS21902-6R union. Problem solved. Of course, I don’t know if that disposition was ever carried out, as I did not inspect that rework, as it was done on second shift that night--maybe. Later that day, (the vendor inspector) and his ((physical description)--that’s all the I.D. I have on him, as I didn’t catch his name) mechanic showed up and asked what was going on with the tag with many expletives interspersed. I calmy told (the vendfor inspector) what had happened, and about the revision I had written. They left. (Another Boeing line inspector), who had taken (name of Boeing inspector who had originally rollerstamped the NCR)'s place on 777 EBUs, was there listening to the conversation. (Name), our lead, arrived on the FME (a huge jig on which the engines were mounted and worked upon), and (the line inspector) and (the QA Lead) began to discuss the legendary "on the job inebriated status" of the (vendor) reps who had just left. They said it would be unwise to put them in a room with our PSD personnel that are similarly affected, (name) and (name) and have one of them light a match. Anyway, the above incident should be somewhat illuminating on the seemingly "who cares what parts we install" attitudes of allegedly drunk vendor representatives who rework the "two strikes you’re a glider" engines at PSD.

Vendor rework: To illustrate how broken the vendor rework inspection process at PSD is: I wrote NCR (number) on a damaged fitting on the (part number, serial number, vendor name) T/R (Thrust Reverser). I believe (a QA Lead) bought the rework on second shift. The T/R was sent back to (the vendor) for additional rework. When it came back to PSD, I had to write (NCR number) item 10 on the same damaged fitting, except the damage was deeper due to some rough file marks on the inner edge of the fitting were made twice as deep as the original damage in a crude attempt to blend part of the damage out. Most of the original damage was untouched. I inspected the rework on the fitting on the second NCR. I had to re-inspect the blending out of the damage multiple times because the (vendor) mechanics didn’t understand what "blending out the damage" meant. They were only removing high metal from the damaged areas. Finally they got it right. (A first shift QA Lead) bought the NCO (plan) for the work, as I was lent to 747 struts for the day and (the noted QA Lead) finished that NCR. Also, to illustrate the roller stamping of vendor rework at PSD, try to find a NCO in which a PSD inspector has routed the NCO back to the shop queue with comments stating the vendor rework was unacceptable. This would be evidence that the vendor rework is not being roller stamped and was actually looked at. In my experience, as I try to inspect all vendor rework, even though much of it may be buried by the time it is put up for sale for me to look at, a significant percentage (I would guess 40% or more) of the vendor rework does not comply with the disposition. See if you find evidence of vendor rework NCOs that were routed back for unacceptable rework. I believe you will find few besides mine. True, sometimes, if the vendor mechanic is right there I’ll have them make the rework comply with the disposition without routing the NCO back, but if the mechanic is not available I will route it back. One I did just today was (NCR number), I believe.

Engine reallocations. I’ve checked into this some more and it, like a dead fish in a trash can on a 100 degree day, stinks more and more the closer I get to it.

(Our QA supervisor) told inspectors that inquired on this taboo subject that the engines are only assigned to a customer A/P at the point when the forklift driver brings them into the building and sets them down at the start of the EBU monorail for receival inspection. Of course, he has no documentation to back this up, it is just "tribal knowledge" apparently. This doesn’t satisfy those inspectors like (name) and I, who want to do our jobs correctly and per procedures, as there are no procedures that state what (our QA supervisor) said. The vendor paper placards that are received on some of the engine shipping covers that indicate a specific customer for that engine would seem to indicate that (our QA supervisor) is lying to us on this subject (see Exhibit AX for a copy of a placard I removed from the fancase of a Rolls Royce 777 engine when I did the receival of it, which indicates (Boeing customer three letter I.D.) as the customer that engine was built for). Of course lying to a lowly line inspector is just a walk in the park for QA Supervisors with the ethics of (ours). His ethics, though, are not his fault. They are a requirement of his job at BCAG. This is typical. QA Management says anything, right or wrong (they don’t seem to care which, if it serves their purposes), to get inspectors off of a certain subject they don’t want explored for obvious reasons, even if they know little or nothing about whether their reasoning is true. This used to bother me. Now it doesn’t. The meeting with (our QA supervisor) on 1/11 filled me in perfectly on why they don’t seem to care, as I’m sure I have repeated too many times before.

Anyway, what we as line inspectors are supposed to do if an engine is received that is not the correct configuration required by that customer per the drawing, is to initiate an "information only" paper pickup or rework "info only" NCR stating the fact that it is the wrong configuration. Then either M.E. Planning or QA Planning will initiate a B/L (blueline job) to rework the engine per a SCCR (Supplier Configuration Change Request) to the correct configuration. Sounds OK, right? Wrong. This is illegal, even if our QA Management managed to get our engine receival QOI approved to state it. The (document I.D.) document, section 3.1.1.2., states that SCCRs are only ("only" is underlined in the document also) to be used to incorporate engine manufacturer requested changes into the engines. This prohibits using them the way we do at PSD--to reallocate engines. Section 6.45 of the document, which defines a SCCR, states that a SCCR requires the support of a SMB/SSB or special installation approval by the CAA/DGAC/FAA/JAA, and commitment by the Boeing Change Board, not just a paper "info only" pickup initiated by a lowly PSD line inspector. Section 3.2.1. of the document states that the engine manufacturers must supply configuration changes, S/Ns, and shortages to Boeing before installation of the engine on a Boeing A/P. That information probably is required much earlier by Boeing than when the forklift driver brings the engine in the plant.

This just in: I saw a stray email sitting on a table in my area for several days and looked at it (see Exhibit AP). It shows how casually we "reallocate" engines at PSD, for just convenience of production issues. While this was just a "reallocation" of engines from one position to another on a 747, which I don’t know is kosher or not to do without a reallocation letter, the same casual, uncaring for the configuration of the product, attitude exists when swapping engines of different configurations among different customers. I believe there used to be, but I don’t know if the situation still exists or not, configuration differences between inboard and outboard engines on some 747s (optional ADP on inboard engines?).

UI/UT parts unit identified: I remember that we had a crew meeting once when name) was the QA Supervisor at PSD, in which this subject came up. This was a meeting after we had heard that PSD was going to remove the requirement from the vendor OPSPs for the vendors to rubber stamp the unit I.D. on the inlets. He said in the meeting that "he didn’t know why the rubber stamps were on the parts," but that they were being deleted. This fits perfectly in with PSD’s QA philosophy that, if we forgot why we do something, or if we haven’t done something that is a requirement for a long time, that we delete the requirement, no matter how important the reason for the requirement was, in order to make the documentation match what we are doing or to cover our asses. Rarely will we ever do the right thing, and just comply with the requirement. You will run into this unethical philosophy constantly in your investigation. You’ll be told "I see the requirement now that you‘ve put the document right under my nose, but we’ve have been doing it the wrong way for so long now, and nothing has literally blown up so far, so please let us change the documentation to match the way we are doing it, because it is saving us a hell of a lot of money and it fits so perfectly well into our Lean Manufacturing philosophy" (well, they won’t say it in exactly those words, but you get the idea). Don’t let us do it. Make us comply with the requirement instead. Only let us change the requirement if it is proven the requirement is totally unworkable, or in error. Don’t fall into the trap that has gotten the BCAG Quality System so corrupted. Don’t let us delete the requirement simply because doing so will improve manufacturing flow or cost. BCAG, as an entity, has demonstrated it can only learn lessons,