This page is for documenting the airplane crashes that have happened because of rollerstamping--especially the rollerstamping
still going on to this day at Boeing. Boeing management cannot feign that they did not know about this fraud or
that it has no consequences for the lives of the public, as I warned them personnally of it at the highest levels of the Boeing
corporation on two seperate occasions.
Yes, horrific crashes have occurred due to rollerstamping at Boeing, and elsewhere. Innocent blood is already
on the hands of Boeing management that were responsible for the rollerstamping that caused the crashes that I will detail
below. But, as horrific as these crashes are that can be traced to rollerstamping work off as acceptable when it was not inspected
with the care required (or inspected at all), the people who died and were maimed in these "accidents" have already suffered
their own personal horrific end on their "flying rollercoaster of death" and that unfortunately can never be
undone. More such "accidents" are all but inevitable because of the rollerstamping in the past and still going on at Boeing,
where my QA managers routinely told inspectors like me that "quality cannot be inspected in-it must be built in." I think that
false mantra that someone drilled into them (and the things Boeing management are required to do to be rewarded
with extra money and promotions) is what causes them to continue to do the opposite of their critical jobs in many cases,
"overlooking" and abetting the rollerstamping at Boeing, instead of doing what is supposed to be their jobs-ensuring
their inspectors are doing their jobs, not just pretending to do them that is the base definition of rollerstamping (by the
way, the reason the "quality cannot be inspected in-it must be built in" is a false reason to subvert Boeing's critical
to public safety quality system is that inspectors' jobs at Boeing are supposed to be to ensure airplane components that
"the quality (and safety) was not built into" by mechanics do not get delivered to customers in that state, and instead those
defects are documented and corrected by mechanics "building in the required quality" before delivery. Inspectors never
have "inspected quality into" airplanes or airplane components at Boeing. It has always had to be built in. But why does Boeing
management keep repeating this falsehood to Boeing inspectors?--It is one of the chief ways they similarly brainwash their
inspectors to not do their jobs and to rollerstamp instead of inspect. As one of my fellow inspectors noted, the "pushing
of garbage (airplane components) out the door" results when inspectors do not do their jobs).
Rollerstamping Boeing commercial airplane crash example #1:
Unfortunately, rollerstamping by inspectors is not a new practice at Boeing. Although I believe the massive rollerstamping
going on today at Boeing is the most egregious ever, it has been going on at Boeing for decades at Boeing with the knowledge
of certain Boeing management.
That is why, I believe, Boeing's Chief Corporate Counsel took my report to them of this massive rollerstamping so seriously
but didn't do anything to stop it--indeed Boeing Legal's actions have been to cover it up and attempt to "kill the messenger"--me,
by my termination and related attempts to discredit me before I went public with it. As they knew I was continuing to collect
data to present to the authorities and make preparations to break the story to the press, Boeing thought they had to
act against me before I "spilled the beans" they had been counting up greedily that they were accumulating due to massive
noncompliance with their FAA-approved quality system that placed personnel on Boeing airplanes at extra risk.
To find out that rollerstamping was not a relatively new practice at Boeing, I did not have to dig much--in
fact the best information came to me.
When I was at Flight Test QA, I worked in the Airworthiness Inspector's office where the Airworthiness Inspector's Leads
spent most of their time during the day. Most of these Leads had about thirty years with the company. I learned much of Boeing's
quality system history from these ultra-experienced QA Leads.
One of these leads was quite a character--someone one is lucky just to be around because of that singular character
born of a far earlier era than the one you grew up in. He would constantly bend your ear with stories of the past at
Boeing, even if he sometimes forgot he told you about that same event earlier.
He told me of (more than once) an occasion much earlier in his 35 year Boeing career when he was an inspector on the
wing line in Everett.
While he was an inspector in the wing jigs, inspectors from his area commonly would work overtime in the wing laydown
area (where the assembled wings fresh from the jigs are completed). He was working overtime in that area and was getting harassed
by shop because he was actually inspecting instead of rollerstamping (I have endured that same harassment many times
at Boeing myself, being "The Last Inspector") the jobs off without inspection which he knew was what was expected of inspectors
who worked that overtime in wing laydown.
Anyway, he didn't let their harassment deter him from inspecting. Soon he had compiled many pickup items from
just a small portion of the wing, much to the chagrin of shop.
At the time, there was a system in place where the different copies of the pickups were supposed to be put in various
bins for defect tracking, shop notification, etc.
In this area, they had a huge banner on the wall stating how their quality was exceptional, and they had few if
any defects in the area.
My QA Lead knew how they accomplished this, and it wasn't by building a quality product. The supervisor of the area just
emptied out the bin with the copies of pickups that were supposed to be picked up by the corrective action unit to compile
defect data with before they picked them up, and round filed them. My QA Lead knew this, so he started making copies of those
copies and in addition to putting the usual copies in the bin that would be trashed, he took the copies directly to the corrective
action folks.
Once the supervisor (it may have been a general supervisor) saw his area being charged with defects he thought he had
ensured would never be known, he investigated, and found out what my Lead was doing. He berated him, and when that didn't
change his behavior, he went to the QA general supervisor to complain. As he was complaining to the QA general while
walking through the area, the QA general supervisor passed where my lead was working. My Lead and the QA General pleasantly
bantered for a bit while the shop supervisor watched. That's when the shop supervisor found out something he didn't know--the
QA general supervisor and my Lead were old friends! Exasperated, the shop supervisor left dejectedly, knowing his "no defects"
scheme was at its end.
Back to the subject at hand - crashes because of rollerstamping, example #1:
I guess it would be fitting to start with the latest one, then work back. As you will know if you have perused certain
portions of this site, the most rollerstamped assembly Boeing built up that I knew of was the 737NG EBUs (Engine Build-Ups), which
in large part was not only due to corruption in Boeing QA management, it was also due to Lean Manufacturing implemented on
that production line. In fact, they had implemented lean manufacturing so completely on the 737NG production line, BCA's CEO
and corporate management used to use the 737NG EBU flowtime reduction because of Lean prominently in their presentations
for years. However, much of this flowtime reduction came by eliminating the time for inspectors to do their critical
jobs of inspecting these EBUs that were thrown together by mechanics as fast as they could assemble them. Not surprisingly,
this resulted in the only thing it could have--massive rollerstamping by inspectors assigned to the production line. Some
did the most inspection they could in the little time they had before rollerstamping the jobs stating they fully inspected
the EBU. Other inspectors performed a more pure method of rollerstamping having even less to do with actual inspection.
Is it not surprising, then, that the currently suspected cause of the crash 24 days ago of a six month
old Kenya Airways 737 NG is engine failure? Kenya Airways flight 507 crashed some 30 seconds after take off
from Douala airport, Cameroon:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya_Airways_Flight_KQ_507
With my extensive experience with these engines, the rollerstamping rather than inspection of these engines I think
is a likely cause of this crash. There is no telling what kind of defects these engines delivered with. That is what you get
with rollerstamping--delivered parts where their quality, safety, and reliabilty are unknown, and can never
be known, until something like this exposes the defects overlooked.
An unfair deduction? Hardly. While this is based upon my extensive experience at Boeing, time will confirm the deaths
rollerstamping can cause in safety related industries such as aviation. I am just giving my honest assessment, as opposed
to some of Boeing's past crash assessments against the data in hand at the time, which assessments proved to be false.
Such was the case with attempting to blame the rudder hardovers and resulting crashes of Flight 585 and Flight 427 on
the pilots of those doomed flights.
So that's rollerstamping crash #1. If it is proved otherwise I will be the first to say so here. So check back
often. As Kenya and Cameroon don't trust the NTSB with a feared Boeing bias with the investigation of the contents of the
recovered flight data recorder and purportedly want Canada to do the investigation, as in past crashes, the true cause
may never be officially known, and/or may vary based upon the bias of the investigators.
